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Contemporary cosmology contains a set of theoretical objects that may be 
considered intellectual constructs in one sense or another. The aim of this paper 
is to examine them as intellectual artefacts and to provide a motivation for this 
examination that stems from debates internal to the field of physical cosmology. 
Examining theoretical terms as intellectual artefacts requires fitting them 
into a conceptual scheme that features such a class of objects. An influential 
example of such a scheme is Karl Popper’s three world ontology, which builds 
on his scientific realism. World 1 is the mind-independent world studied by the 
natural sciences, whereas World 2 is the realm of subjective mental phenomena, 
which somehow emerges from World 1 but is not reducible to it. World 2 then 
produces World 3, where intellectual artefacts, such as scientific theories, are to 
be found. In contrast to the private and subjective World 2, the objects of World 
3 have a public, “autonomous” existence apart from the mental states that 
populate World 2. For example, scientific theories have logical relations and 
may have unnoticed consequences and inconsistencies. (Pera 2006, 273-4) 
It may be claimed that all objects belonging to World 3 can be regarded as 
intellectual artefacts, but in this paper the focus is on individual terms employed 
in physical cosmology, and the claim regarding their artefactual status is 
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restricted: here, only those terms that are employed in false theories are claimed 
to be clearly artefactual. This, in turn, requires the assumption that some theories 
are false, even though terms employed in these false theories are still used in our 
language, especially in philosophical discourse. 
Dark matter is one of the latest potential intellectual artefacts from the field 
of cosmology, and a description and evaluation of its theoretical role is the main 
focus of this paper. For this purpose, another methodological assumption is 
utilized here, namely a classification of theoretical objects taken from Russian 
logician E. K. Voishvillo. (2014, 13) In this classification, theoretical objects are 
contrasted with objects of observation. Although both are featured in scientific 
theories, whether an object is theoretical or an observed one, in this specific 
sense, depends on the basis on which they are employed in a theory. Objects of 
observation are taken as given at the moment of constructing a theory, whereas 
theoretical objects are introduced to a pre-existent theory for the purpose 
explaining some phenomenon. 
Among theoretical objects, a further non-exhaustive division may be 
introduced:  
1) Abstract objects represent some of the properties of real2 objects, or their 
relationships, actually turned into independent objects of thought – they are the 
results of isolating abstraction (e.g. the rotation of the Sun, the lifetime of a star, 
mass, force).  
2) Idealized objects, which are created from observed objects by the logical 
operation of idealization: properties are either removed or added to them (e.g. 
absolute instability, absolute black body).  
3) Ideal objects are the results of creative activity of thought, which usually 
play an instrumental role in the construction of a theory (e.g. complex numbers, 
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a system of coordinates). Unlike an idealized object, an ideal object is not 
constructed from a real object to which the operation of idealization is 
performed. Rather, there is nothing in empirical domain to begin with that could 
be considered a “non-ideal” counterpart to an ideal object.  
4) Hypothetical objects are objects that enter into thinking when 
constructing explanatory theories of empirical phenomena. When such objects 
are postulated, they are unobserved, but with the development of science can be 
independently detected, thus gaining the status of real objects, or being fictitious 
are discarded from the theories. In the latter case, what remains of them are the 
previously mentioned terms that are taken to be intellectual artefacts (those 
terms that feature in false theories), which are said to refer to empty objects (e.g. 
phlogiston and caloric). 
Notably, the need for hypothetical objects may arise when there are 
discrepancies between theoretical predictions and empirical data. A hypothetical 
object can be employed to explain this discrepancy and save the theory from 
modification. Of course, modifying the theory is another way of explaining such 
a discrepancy, as shall be demonstrated. 
In the history of science, and astronomy in particular, there are several 
prominent examples of theory choice, where the choice was between modifying 
a theory or affirming the existence of a hypothetical object.  
The existence of five planets had been recognized by observers since 
antiquity: Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn.3 As Baum and Sheehan 
note (1997, 45), early modern astronomers had a tendency to attempt to reduce 
this system of observed planets to calculation in order to determine the laws 
describing their motions, rather than to assume that there might be unobserved 
objects affecting their orbits. By the late 18th century, even the particularly 
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tricky case of Jupiter and Saturn’s seemingly irregular orbits had been solved by 
Laplace, confirming the sufficiency of Newton’s theory of gravitation (the then 
unresolved case of Mercury’s advancing perihelion shall be addressed 
presently). (ibid., 38) 
It was thus a surprise to the astronomical community, when the orbit of the 
planet Uranus, discovered in 1781 by Hanover-born amateur astronomer 
William Herschel, could not be fitted with the theory. The reluctance to 
postulate a hypothetical object affecting Uranus’s orbit meant that even 
modifying Newton’s law of gravitation was on the table4, although it remained 
an unattractive option, since it had so famously triumphed in the face of 
previous difficulties. Thus, it was considered a last resort by Urbain Jean-Joseph 
Le Verrier, who instead focused his efforts on constructing a hypothetical object 
that would explain the discrepancy.  Fortunately for Newton’s theory, a planet 
matching exactly the predicted properties of this hypothetical object was 
observed on September 23, 1846 by Johann Gottfried Galle at the Royal 
Observatory of Prussia. Neptune had been discovered, in what Levenson (2015, 
Ch. 3) describes as ”the climax of what was almost immediately understood to 
be the popular triumph of Newtonian science.” 
However, the case of Mercury’s advancing perihelion continued to tarnish 
the otherwise immaculate precision of Newton’s theory throughout the 19th 
century. Again, the existence of a hypothetical object, the planet Vulcan5, was 
postulated by Le Verrier to save the theory. The existence of such a planet had 
never been confirmed, however, despite observations dating back to the ancient 
Chaldeans and Chinese. (Baum and Sheehan 1997, 146). Sunspots had been 
detected by astronomers, of course, and sometimes they had been even mistaken 
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for planets. Nonetheless, their movement across the Sun’s disk was never as 
rapid as that of a planet’s motion relative to an Earth observer, which is why the 
French amateur astronomer Lerscarbault was astonished to find an object 
moving rapidly across the edge of the Sun’s disk on March 26, 1859 (ibid., 147-
148). After he communicated the observation to Le Verrier, controversy ensued. 
Although Le Verrier himself admitted that the object observed could not be 
sufficiently massive to account for the perturbation it supposedly caused to 
Mercury’s orbit, he remained a firm believer in the existence of Vulcan. (ibid. 
157) Further predicted appearances of Vulcan were failures, and supposed 
observations were sporadic. (ibd. 162-168) The explanatory need for such a 
planet disappeared in any case, when Einstein’s theory of general relativity was 
confirmed. A notable feature of the case of Vulcan is that the planet had been 
“observed” before being deemed a mere intellectual artefact. Therefore, at least 
for some astronomers, Vulcan was an empirical object, which is a healthy 
reminder that human fallibility is not restricted to speculative theorizing but also 
observation. 
In a contemporary, unresolved case, namely that of dark matter, 
cosmologists of today face a situation similar to the one in which astronomers 
found themselves in the two previous examples. In the 1930s, the Swiss 
astronomer Fritz Zwicky studied the galaxy cluster Coma and found that the 
visible mass is insufficient to account for the observed gravitational effects. 
Galaxies in the cluster move at very high velocities with respect to their center 
of mass. When the mass required to keep the cluster together is calculated, the 
result is over one hundred times greater than the mass of the observed cluster. 
Zwicky suggested, that there must be invisible mass, dunkle Materie (dark 
matter) that provides the gravitational pull. The observations did not fit the 
theory, so a hypothetical object was introduced. (Zwicky 1938, 243-246) 
Forty years later, Vera Rubin, studying individual galaxies, noticed that on 
the periphery of galaxies, the velocity at which stars and gas clouds rotate 
around the center of spiral galaxies is unexpectedly high. Based on Newton’s 
laws, when moving from the galactic center to its periphery, the rotational 
velocity of the galactic objects is inversely proportional to the square root of the 
distance from the center. However, observations show that the rate does not fall, 
but rather it is constant. Thus, the rotation curve produced by Newtonian laws 
does not match the observational records. (Rubin and Ford 1970, 394) 
Rubin’s discovery was taken to be additional evidence for the existence of 
dark matter. Lately, many more arguments have been presented for its existence. 
The most recent evidence is based on the theory of general relativity and called 
the method of gravitational lensing. One consequence of general relativity is the 
assertion that any massive object warps space. If radiation is received from a 
distant galaxy, a galaxy cluster positioned between the source of the radiation 
and the observer bends the rays. Based on how much deformation occurs, it is 
possible to calculate the mass of the object distorting the radiation. Again, these 
calculations result in the conclusion that there must be more mass than that 
which we can detect. 
These considerations have resulted in the wide acceptance of the so-called 
standard cosmological model, the ΛCDM (lambda-cold dark matter)6 model, 
which predicts that 4.9% of the universe consists of baryons - of which all 
visible objects are made - and weakly interacting particles, neutrinos. The 
remaining 95.1% are hypothetical objects: 26.8% is dark matter, an object that 
cannot be directly detected, as it does not interact with electromagnetic 
radiation, but the existence of which is postulated on the basis of observable 
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gravitational effects. Finally, 68.3% of the universe consists of dark energy, 
introduced to explain the apparent expansion of the universe. (Ade et al. 2013) 
It is not difficult to find prominent examples of dark matter being referred to 
as an object whose existence has already been confirmed, although no 
observations of it have ever been made despite decades of attempts. (Milgrom 
2014) Several hypothetical particles have been proposed as candidates for filling 
the theoretical role of dark matter. Corresponding detectors have been built and 
continuous experiments have been run, but the results have been inconclusive – 
due to the very theoretically laden method required to observe something that 
does not interact with electromagnetic radiation, there are far too many 
alternative interpretations of the data that cannot be ruled out. 
Perhaps the most promising alternative to dark matter has nothing to do with 
alternative interpretations of data gathered by dark matter detectors, however. 
Instead, the same option remains as in the case of Uranus and Mercury, i.e. 
modifying the theory whose predictions do not match the observations. Once 
again, the theory in question is the current theory of gravitation. Modified 
Newtonian dynamics (MOND) is often considered the strongest contender for 
solving the so-called mass discrepancy problem (or acceleration discrepancy, as 
some MOND proponents prefer to call it), because unlike theories postulating 
dark matter, it has actually managed to produce successful, specific, novel 
predictions, especially at the scale of individual galaxies. (Milgrom, 2014) 
In 1983, MOND creator Mordechai Milgrom introduced a new parameter to 
the laws of Newton and produced novel theoretical predictions that turned out to 
be consistent with observations made several years later. Milgrom suggested 
that Newtonian dynamics is applicable only to large accelerations that can be 
found, for example, in our solar system. As soon a system with small 
accelerations is examined, there are discrepancies. A parameter introduced by 
Milgrom, critical acceleration, – a0 – is a new constant (a0 = 1.2 x 10-10 m / s2). It 
separates small acceleration, which is less than a0, and large acceleration, if it is 
greater than a0. (ibid.) In accordance with this, a modification is made to 
Newton’s laws:  
 
“When the acceleration is much larger than a0, Newton’s second law applies 
as usual: force is proportional to acceleration. But when the acceleration is small 
compared with a0, Newton’s second law is altered: force becomes proportional 
to the square of the acceleration. By this scheme, the force needed to impart a 
given acceleration is always smaller than Newtonian dynamics requires. To 
account for the observed accelerations in galaxies, MOND predicts a smaller 
force—hence, less gravity-producing mass—than Newtonian dynamics does ... 
In this way, it can eliminate the need for dark matter.” (Milgrom 2002, 46) 
 
As can be seen, the rivalry between MOND and dark matter theories has 
similarities to the famous cases in the history of astronomy, where choices were 
made regarding the introduction of novel intellectual artifacts into the universe 
of real objects. An important difference is that in the historical examples, 
Newton’s theory was able to overcome many apparent difficulties by producing 
novel predictions that aligned with later observational data to an exceptional 
degree, with Neptune’s discovery standing out as an eminent example. Dark 
matter theories, in contrast, make no unique predictions, and thus lack a 
theoretical virtue crucial to the celebrated speculative constructs of the past. 
MOND, on the other hand, boasts several predictive successes, although its 
extension to the domain of relativistic and cosmological phenomena remains an 
incomplete task. (Milgrom 2014) 
 
However, it remains a sociological fact that dark matter theories are dominant in 
the discipline, which naturally enough has turned some proponents of MOND to 
theorize on the sociological aspects of cosmology. (See, e.g. Lopez-Corredoira 
2008) The situation can be summarized in the following way: for any given 
observation, if the observation is consistent with dark matter theories, dark 
matter theories are confirmed. If the observation is inconsistent with dark matter 
theories, then the observation must be wrong. If the observation is consistent 
with MOND, the observation must also be wrong. If the observation is 
inconsistent with MOND, MOND is falsified.7 
 
In the face of such controversies, those with empiricist inclinations might want 
to suspend judgment, until decisive observational evidence is produced to rule 
out at least one of the competing theories. However, it is worth mentioning that 
here the relevant philosophical input might come not just from studying the 
history of science, but also from novel methodological reflection, such as 
applying certain tools developed by 20th century logicians. This would involve 
adding normative suggestions to the descriptive examination of theoretical terms 
as intellectual artefacts, which this paper has been concerned with. 
 
In fact, the need for such methodological reform may be best understood by 
those keeping an eye on the historical development of the discipline, since they 
may be justifiably concerned by contemporary physicists’ relative isolation from 
philosophy, when compared to those physicists who produced the most 
significant breakthroughs of the early 20th century, such as Mach, Einstein, 
Schrödinger, Heisenberg and others, who were keen practitioners of 
methodological reflection. 
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